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Abstract
Background: The Tobacco Industry (henceforth TI) yearns to portray itself as being “socially responsible” and fights
for the decision-making positions; that are it used to deter, delay or dilute tobacco control measures. There is little
documented evidence of Tobacco Industry Interference (henceforth TII) from India, the scope of their interference
and challenges faced by the experts for effective tobacco control. This research study seeks to cover this significant
gap in the literature on the TI of India.
Methods: A cross-sectional qualitative research design, based upon in-depth interviews (N = 26), was used to
explore the key stakeholders’ opinions regarding TII in India. The interviews used a set of questions to collect
information about the participant’s roles and responsibilities in tobacco control, the nature of TII faced by the
participants, means of influence by TI, barriers and challenges to tobacco control efforts.
Results: Most of the respondents were engaged in tobacco control, training, advocacy and awareness generation
activities for 5–10 years or more. The respondents defined the TI and its scope as per their experience with the help
of the power ranking methodology. Most of them perceived TI as ‘manufacturers’ while others consider them as
‘advertisers’, ‘public relation companies’, ‘wholesalers’, ‘vendors’, and ‘Government firms with TI stocks. The research
team identified six significant domains: influencing the policy and administrative decisions, Interference in the
implementation of tobacco control laws and activities, false propaganda and hiding the truth, manipulating front
action groups (FAG), rampant tobacco advertising and promotion activities and others under which TII activities
were classified. Most respondents believed that TI players were interfering in the policy decisions, implementing the
tobacco control laws and activities and manipulating the FAG. A detailed taxonomic classification of the TII
strategies that emerged from our analysis was linked to article 5.3 of FCTC.
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Conclusions: The study documented a significant level of TII in different domains, with stakeholders acting at
various hierarchical levels. Thus providing insight into the tactics of the TI in order to enable stakeholders to
anticipate and pre-empt the kinds of alliances the TI may attempt to build; stimulating academicians and
researchers to undertake in-depth analysis into various strategies and therefore underscoring the need to ensuring
transparency in official interaction with the TI and its representatives.
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Background
About 275 million tobacco users reside in India [1]. This
leads to the widespread production and consumption of
various forms of tobacco. Due to high tobacco usage,
India has one of the highest rates of oral cancer in the
world, with an annual incidence as high as 10 per
100,000 among men [2]. This increased burden makes it
one of the most important preventable public health
problems. Therefore, the Tobacco Industry (TI) needs to
be treated differently from other industries due to the
fundamental conflict between their goals. Global evi-
dence suggests that the TI is a formidable opponent of
public health and development; determined to recruit
new tobacco users at the cost of public health. The TI
constantly portrays and reinvents itself as being “socially
responsible” and therefore eligible for a seat at policy-
making positions, which it uses to deter, delay or dilute
tobacco control measures [3]. Public health organiza-
tions have now recognized that TI and its associated
front groups and their diverse partners are the leading
cause of persistent tobacco use [4]. Despite the adoption
of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act
(COTPA) in 2003 and the subsequent launch of the Na-
tional Tobacco Control Program in 2007, the TI of India
has actively opposed and undermined the Government’s
efforts to present evidence and countered evidence-
backed policies that protect people from the harm of to-
bacco use [5, 6]. Thus, a strong political commitment at
the global and regional level is needed to counter the
hydra-headed TI if the health of citizens is to be
protected.
Eliminating the TI from health policy design is poten-
tially the single most effective measure that governments
can adopt to protect tobacco control activities, thereby
addressing the death and disease caused by the tobacco
epidemic. Article 5.3 of the World Health Organization
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO
FCTC) and its guidelines provide a roadmap for why
and how TII in health policies can be eliminated [7].
The Article calls for measures by the governments to de-
fend health policy “from commercial and other vested
interests of the TI” [8]. Also, the parties to the FCTC are
obligated to objectively submit reports about the efforts
made for strict implementation of the provisions, includ-
ing Article 5.4, regularly to the Convention Secretariat
[9]. In 2008, the Parties (COP) Conference to the FCTC
adopted a series of guidelines and recommendations for
the implementation of Article 5.3 [10]. WHO Article 5.3
has a set of guideline recommendations on awareness-
raising (recommendations 1.1–1.2), on limiting interaction
with the tobacco industry (recommendations 2.1–2.2), on
the rejection of industry partnerships (recommendations
3.1–3.4), on the avoidance of conflicts of interest (recom-
mendations 4.1–4.11), on transparency (recommendations
5.1–5.5), on the denormalization of industry “corporate
social responsibility” activities (recommendations 6.1–6.4),
on preferential treatment of the tobacco industry (recom-
mendations 7.1–7.3) and state-owned tobacco industries
(recommendations 8.1–8.3).
Despite global agreement through FCTC, TI has been
extending its scope to control policy and legislation in
high-income countries (HIC) and low and middle-
income countries (LMIC) alike. Hence, the existing lit-
erature can be used to anticipate and therefore counter
TII irrespective of the geographic boundaries [11, 12].
The TI has been interjecting using four main pretexts—
economic activity, marketing/promotion, political activ-
ity and deceptive/manipulative activity [12]. These
pretexts are implemented through a broad array of tech-
niques, including testimonies, position papers, constitu-
ency letters contacts, and face-to-face discussions
between representatives from TI and legislators for the
attainment of its objective to obstruct annul, amend or
halt pending legislation [13]. A detailed report of the
Corporate Accountability International comprehensively
captures the interference, which comprises of destabiliz-
ing and making use of legislative ambiguities, demanding
a seat at Government negotiating tables, advocating vol-
untary regulation instead of legislation, drafting and dis-
tributing sample legislation which is advantageous to the
TI, questioning and stretching government timetables
for implementing laws, trying to influence legislators,
gaining favour by funding government schemes on other
health issues and preserving trade benefits at the cost of
health [13, 14].
Besides weakening legislation in almost all developing
countries that have a significant number of smokers
[15–17] and launching specific scathing attacks on gov-
ernments to prevent its extermination [18], TI uses tac-
tics to undermine the importance of various scientific
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studies done to generate evidence regarding the harmful
impact of tobacco [19]. This fact was highlighted by TI
documents which clearly state that the TI prevented the
diffusion of studies and innovation that can lead to more
significant restrictions on smoking and therefore initi-
ated attempts to nullify them through counter research,
altering media and public opinion and lobbying adminis-
tration [19–21]. Given the power and size of the TI,
such repulsion can have a significant impact on legisla-
tive initiatives in different countries [22]. Also, it is now
clear that geographic boundaries do not circumscribe
TII and TI has adopted strategies to alter policy deci-
sions at local levels that bring much more significant ef-
fects [23]. Reports from HICs and LMICs have explicitly
delineated TII’s heinous and nefarious acts utilizing the
case study approach among the stakeholders of tobacco
control [13, 24–27]. However, there is little evidence
from India that research has attempted to analyse the
TII, its direct and indirect allies and its modus-operandi.
In this context, the study’s main objective was to docu-
ment the evidence on Article 5.3 of WHO FCTC imple-
mentation and related violations in India over the last
decade (2007–2017). Specifically, it explored different
stakeholders involved in TI, the nature of interactions
between the TI and diverse actors (front groups). They
influence tobacco control at the behest of the TI in
India. This is among the very first attempts from India
and among the few attempts globally to document the
evidence of TII in tobacco control activities through
evidence-based discussion [26, 27] and suggestions of




This is a scoping study, based upon in-depth interviews,
conducted between October 2017 and March 2018. In
the study, the research team intended to document the
range, extent and nature of TII in India [28]. When data
on the ‘perception of TI’ and ‘means of TII in India’
were obtained, they were prioritized using the power
ranking method [29].
Study settings and participants
Initially, a series of meetings among the investigators of
two government institutes of national excellence of India
(referred to as Institute 1 and Institute 2, respectively
henceforth) along with the representatives from funding
partners viz. International Union against TB and Lung
Diseases (The Union), South East Asia, New Delhi, and
WHO Country Office for India were conducted to frame
the study protocol, in-depth interview schedule and the
list of key informants for in-depth interviews through
detailed deliberation.
Inclusion criteria
Irrespective of the years of experience, the stakeholders
of tobacco control in India who have served between the
years 2007 and 2017 as a member of a civil society/re-
searcher/program manager/policymaker: in various cap-
acities (at state and national levels) and agencies
(Government, private and non-governmental) were en-
listed as critical informants for the study. For the power
ranking method, participants were chosen depending on
their expertise in tobacco control.
Sample and sampling method
The research team approached 30 stakeholders, irre-
spective of the number of years of experience in tobacco
control. A purposive sampling technique was employed
to select the participants who could provide in-depth in-
formation on the study topic. Four respondents denied
consent for the interview and we could finally interview
26 stakeholders (14 by Institute 1 and 12 by Institute 2).
For employing the power ranking method, a panel of key
informants who were expert in tobacco control as sub-
stantiated by the richness of information shared during
in-depth interviews were selected using purposive sam-
pling. Hence, a total of 10 members were chosen for
participating in the power ranking method.
Study tool
The in-depth semi-structured interview schedule (Sup-
plementary File 1) was developed and used to collect the
desired information. The interview schedule through a
set of ten questions collected data on the socio-
demographic characteristics of participant’s roles and re-
sponsibilities in tobacco control, the nature of TII faced
by the participant, means of influence by TI, barriers
and challenges to tobacco control efforts. The interview
schedule was pre-tested and the required modifications
were made after discussion. Based on the findings of in-
depth interviews, ranking sheets were developed for pri-
oritizing the ‘perceptions of tobacco industry’ and
‘means of TII in India’. (Supplementary File 2 & 3).
Data collection
The participants were contacted over email for deter-
mining their willingness after explaining the study pur-
pose and procedures through the consent form and
Participant Information Sheet. The confidentiality and
anonymity of the participants were assured. After receiv-
ing their consent, a convenient time and method for
data collection (Telephone or Face-to-Face) was deter-
mined. In non-responders, two reminders (through
email) within a gap of two weeks were sent, followed by
prompting through telephonic reminders to boost re-
sponse rates. Alongside, two researchers who had prior
experience in conducting qualitative research interviews
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were recruited and trained in collecting data by the team
of study investigators.
Each participant interview was audio-recorded and
transcribed in English. During the interviews, field notes
were taken to capture contextual details and non-verbal
information. Field notes were shared with the partici-
pants at the end of the interviews to ascertain accuracy.
Each interview lasted for approximately 40–45 min.
The power ranking method was carried out through a
consultative meeting, with the results from the in-depth
interviews among the investigators and selected key in-
formants. The second investigator served as moderator
for the meeting. Participants were first trained to rank
responses collated from the in-depth interviews using re-
spective questionnaires.
Rank ordering was done in two steps. In the first step,
the participants were asked to rank their ‘perception of
TI’ and ‘means of TII in India’ based on their priorities.
In both the lists, the participants ranked the responses
between 1 and 17 such that “1” represented the least
representative and “17” correspond to the most repre-
sentative of tobacco industry/means to TII. The individ-
ual rank orders were aggregated to develop the
consolidated lists on ‘perception of TI’ and ‘means of TII
in India’.
In step two, the collated lists were shown to the partic-
ipants with the objective to construct the final priori-
tized order of responses of both lists through an iterative
process. Here, the facilitator encouraged each participant
to critically evaluate the aggregated lists and sought
reordering of prioritized reactions if needed. When a
participant suggested reordering a response in the lists,
the facilitator sought a consensus from the others on the
positioning and invited them to reposition it as appro-
priate. Adjusting the positions of responses in the lists
continued until a final order of responses was agreed
upon by the group members.
Analysis
Verbatim transcripts were analyzed systematically using
the inductive approach of qualitative content analysis.
For analysis, each interview transcript was read several
times to identify textual segments relevant to the re-
search questions under study. Relevant texts, when iden-
tified, were initially assigned codes along with
descriptive labels. Subsequently, whenever related texts
were found, they were allotted to previously coined
codes and newer codes for emerging textual segments.
Data collection and analysis were conducted concur-
rently to facilitate the generation of codes according to
data stemming from participant interviews.
A framework of codes developed in the process was
then grouped into sub-categories, sub-themes and major
themes, based on similarities and differences between
the codes. Once the sub-themes and themes were gener-
ated, they were compared with the textual segments of
the interview transcripts to ensure that the themes
reflected the message conveyed by the participants dur-
ing the interviews.
Two of the investigators were involved in data triangu-
lation. After themes and sub-themes were generated for
each transcript individually, the interview data and the
field notes were exchanged electronically to validate in-
terpretations (codes, sub-themes and themes) made.
When discrepancies arose during the validation process,
the interpretation by the Principal Investigator was con-
sidered to be final.
The results are presented descriptively under major
themes derived from the study. They are substantiated
with relevant quotations from the interview transcripts.
Repeated and unnecessary words were removed from
the quotes to enhance comprehension while retaining its
essence.
Table 1 General details of the respondents invited for in-depth
interviews
Institute 1 Institute 2 Total
Total 14 (100) 12 (100) 26 (100)
Sex
Male 11 (78.6) 11 (91.7) 22 (84.6)
Female 3 (21.4) 1 (8.3) 4 (15.4)
Age
25-45 years 3 (21.4) 5 (41.7) 8 (30.8)
45-above 5 (35.7) 5 (41.7) 10 (38.5)
Not mentioned 6 (42.8) 2 (16.6) 8 (3.8)
Position
Civil society representative 6 (42.8) 5 (41.7) 11 (42.3)
Program manger 4 (28.6) 3 (25) 7 (26.9)
Researcher 3 (21.4) 3 (25) 6 (23.1)
Policy maker 1 (7.2) 1 (8.3) 2 (7.7)
Occupation status
In service 8 (57.1) 11 (91.7) 19 (73.1)
Retired 1 (7.1) 1 (8.3) 2 (7.7)
Self employed 5 (35.7) – 5 (19.2)
Organization
Government 5 (35.7) 5 (41.7) 10 (38.5)
Non-Government 4 (28.5) 7 (58.3) 11 (42.3)
Private 5 (35.7) – 5 (19.2)
Years of Association with tobacco control
5–10 years 10 (71.4) 5 (41.7) 15 (57.7)
11–20 years 2 (14.3) 5 (41.7) 7 (26.9)
20 years above 2 (14.3) 2 (16.6) 4 (15.4)
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In the power ranking method, consolidated lists of re-
sponses were developed by taking an average of ranks
given by each participant to each response in the lists. In
the list ‘means of TII’ (Supplementary File 3), the ‘in-
volvement of tobacco industry role players’ across each
‘theme of TII’ was considered to be ‘present’ only when
the final rank order of responses received a consensus
from at least half (at least five) of the participants during
the step two of the power ranking method.
Ethics considerations
The study was approved by the Institutional Ethics
Committees of Jawaharlal Institute of Postgraduate Med-
ical Education and Research (IEC ref. no.- JIP/IEC/2017/
0477 and Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education
and Research, Chandigarh (IEC ref. No. PGI/IEC/2017/
565). The duly signed consent forms were taken from
the respondents via email before conducting the inter-
views, with an option to withdraw from the study at any
point in time. The study was conducted and reported ac-
cording to the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting
Qualitative Research (COREQ) [30].
Results
In the study, the majority of participants were men
(84.6%), and most were in service (73.1%), i.e., they were
serving a government-institution (38.5%), non-
government institution (42.3%), or private organization
(19.2%). The majority were civil society representatives
(42%), and over half of them (57.7%) were engaged in
tobacco control activities from the last 5–10 years. The
characteristics of the study participants are summarised
in Table 1.
Almost all respondents perceived the tobacco industry
as ‘Manufacturers’ (Mean score = 9) while more than
half of them identified ‘advertisers’, ‘public relation (PR)
companies’, ‘wholesalers’, ‘vendors’, and ‘Government
firms having TI stocks’ as the tobacco industry. (Table
2). The power ranking method on prioritizing the
players of the tobacco industry’s involvement in various
themes of TI interferences showed that the ‘manufac-
turers’ and ‘PR companies’ were involved in all six types
of industry interference pretexts identified in the study.
Industry-led unions and farmer’s corporations were in-
volved in all types of interferences except Tobacco Ad-
vertising, Promotion and Sponsorship (TAPS) activities.
The industry-sponsored hospitality sector was also in-
volved in all types of interference except hampering the
implementation of tobacco control in the country
(Table 3). The majority of role players, including ‘whole-
salers’, ‘bidi rollers’, ‘politicians’, ‘bureaucrats’ and ‘civil
society organizations’, were associated with four types of
industry-led interferences in the country. (Table 4)
“TI are various kinds of people who lead or who are
part of tobacco production and selling (tobacco).
Whosoever works for furthering the interests of TI
are also part of TI; they may be peers, packagers,
marketers, or advertisers are also TI.” (One
respondent).
Table 2 Perception of study participants regarding Tobacco Industry using ‘Power Ranking Methodology’






Government with tobacco stocks 5.8
Government without tobacco stocks 2.2
Tobacco union workers 4.6
Farmers 3.8
Farmers corporations 4
Pension funds and other Financial incentive schemes 2.6




Civil Society Organization 3.6
Hospitality Industry 0.6
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“It's an established industry which is present in both
organized and unorganized industry and it is well
connected (politically).” (a health professional)
Interference of tobacco industry with tobacco control
activities
The analysis of all the key informant interviews regard-
ing interference of TI with tobacco control activities
generated six themes and categories, as shown in Table
3 and Fig. 1.
Influencing the policy and administrative decisions
Participants see TI as a prime intruder in policy-making
and key administrative decisions of the Government.
The participants opined that TI uses monetary and
power tactics to influence policymakers in placing to-
bacco control in the backseat.
Nearly everybody believed that TI structures signifi-
cant supporters towards income for the administration
and making business for some families like tobacco pro-
ducers and tobacco vendors. A participant surmised that
TI had been traditionally involved in various govern-
mental development projects, which directly contradicts
Article 5.3 of FCTC.
“TI are spending crores of money in various states.
They are sponsoring a lot of money in the food in-
dustry.” (A tobacco control advocate)
“Recently we had got a governmental order issued
for increased taxation on tobacco products which
was immediately reversed by our Government, pos-
sibly due to pressure (of TI). Similarly, political
leaders opposed the ban of Gutka (oral chewable to-
bacco) in the parliament on the pretext of loss of in-
come of farmers” (A tobacco control advocate)
The participants felt that TI creates an impression of ‘no
immediate threat associated with tobacco’ among the
Table 3 Role of tobacco industry in interfering tobacco control activities in India
Themes Sub-themes
Influencing the policy and administrative decisions Projected revenue generation and livelihood creation
Providing sponsorships for government events & political parties
Using policy loopholes
Offering undue favors
Lack of prioritization towards tobacco control
Interference with implementation of tobacco control laws
and activities
Interference in the judiciary system
Interfering with work of tobacco control officials
Interference in functioning of NGOs who work on tobacco control
Prompting sellers for non-cooperation with tobacco control officials
False propaganda and hiding the truth Exaggerating the economic impact of tobacco and loss of livelihood
Hiding facts about tobacco harms
Promoting CSR activities to gain social respectability
Hiding involvement in sponsored events
Misguiding tobacco growers
Manipulating through front action groups Instigating protests and non-cooperation
Threatening tobacco shop owners
Rampant tobacco advertising and promotion activities Promoting surrogate advertisements
Creating new customer base with attractive offers
Support and bonus for tobacco shops and vendors
Others Evidence of Government honoring tobacco industry officials
Poor awareness on harmful effects of tobacco among ancillary stakeholders of
tobacco industry
Lack of cohesion at institutional levels for tobacco control discussion at state and
national level
Lack of understanding and support for tobacco control initiatives
Situational priority i.e. tobacco control taking backseat over other priority issues
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public, which results in a lack of public pressure on pol-
icymakers and politicians in framing effective tobacco
control policies.
“Unlike accidents and epidemics, tobacco use is not
seen as an immediate danger to politicians and pub-
lic, which is effectively utilized by TI. Whenever we
go to public for a raid (COTPA enforcement), they
question, 'why don't you close the tobacco companies
rather than making the people suffer?” (A govern-
ment official)
The respondents also shared the information that many
political parties and officials in the Government receive
favors from TI, which undermine tobacco-related policy
decisions.
“In one of our state’s budgets, the then minister de-
clared a 5% VAT on bidis, which was immediately
reversed to zero percent on the behest of TI, which
we could be due to interference from the TI.” (A gov-
ernment official)
Tobacco is still not considered an illegal product and no
license is needed for processing, manufacturing or sell-
ing tobacco products, unlike liquor by the law of the
land. TI uses this argument to convince policymakers to
make tobacco products easily accessible at various Point
of Sales.
“The biggest challenge for us is that we are one of
the largest tobacco-growing and exporting countries.
It's not an illegal product. TI use this argument for
its easy accessibility in markets” (A health
professional)
TI takes advantage of slow legal proceedings and poor
implementation of tobacco control laws. The conflict-
ing orders from different ministries provide the op-
portunity for the TI to carry out promotional
activities.
“TI has people who find loopholes in government
policie, which leads to slowing of legal proceedings.”
(A government official)







Theme 2 (Interference with
implementation of tobacco















Manufacturer Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wholesaler Y Y Y Y
Vendors Y Y Y
Advertisers Y Y Y
PR Companies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Government with
tobacco stocks







Y Y Y Y Y
Farmers Y Y Y
Farmers
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Banks etc. Y Y Y
Bidi rollers Y Y Y Y
Politicians Y Y Y Y
Bureaucrats Y Y Y Y
Civil Society
Organizations
Y Y Y Y
Hospitality Industry Y Y Y Y Y
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The participants reported undue favours being offered
by the higher officials of the Government from the TI
representatives in the form of gift hampers or
financial support to the organizations, as a tool to in-
fluence them to take policy decisions at the behest of
TI.
“One of the Corporation officials daughter’s marriage
was completely sponsored by a Gutka industry, start-
ing from booking marriage hall to buying jewelry
which was almost everything for the wedding.” (A to-
bacco control activist)
Most of the respondents felt that the TI uses existing
corruption within the system and week political setup to
their benefit.
“TI tries to build pressure through their political rep-
resentatives to delay or dilute the policies.” (A
participant).
“Vested interests of politicians results in lack of their
will to combat Tobacco menace.” (A participant)
Few of the respondents threw light on how TI manipu-
lates policy making and implementation by challenging
such procedures in the court by using fake documents
and poorly generated scientific evidence. Respondents
reported witnessing instances when the TI used artificial
self-sponsored researches in its favour.
“Smokeless tobacco lobby always tries to threaten
them (Government officials). They also support high-
Fig. 1 Thematic diagram showing various tactics used by tobacco industry for survival
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level officials to refine the fake evidence which are
provided by TI in support of their business.” (A
respondent)
Interference with the implementation of tobacco control
laws and activities
The participants believed that TI is a well-established
sector with a tremendous amount of money. They inter-
fere with implementing tobacco control laws and activ-
ities by influencing the judiciary, implementing officials,
non-government officials and merchant association or
tobacco sellers. The respondents stated that legal chal-
lenges (litigations, RTIs etc.), offering undue favors, issu-
ing threats are being used as weapons by the TI to
interfere in the implementation of tobacco control laws.
“TI has top level lawyers who challenge every favor-
able decision on tobacco control in the court of law,
to dilute its effective implementation” (A tobacco
control advocate).
“After a state high court had given an order about
the 85% pictorial warning on tobacco packets, TI
went to court several times which delayed its imple-
mentation.” (An academician and researcher)
“TI representatives met me with an only agenda to
stop supporting govt. initiatives in tobacco control
program.” (A public health activist)
“TI threatened me for implementing tobacco control
activities in my state and even filed many RTIs to
build the pressure.” (A government official)
“Sometimes, when we are creating awareness among
shopkeepers, some agents used to come from a par-
ticular company, and question us why are we stop-
ping their business?” (A tobacco cessation expert)
“Foundation for Smoke Free World associated with a
multinational tobacco company, is trying to influ-
ence people who are working for tobacco control.
This foundation approached many tobacco control
advocates through in-person meetings and mails by
presenting favours. The foundation approached
President of an association but he denied their pro-
posal. I sense that TI has used its financial muscle
power to cancel FCRA licence of many associations.”
(A respondent)
Most of the respondents said that the TI creates a non-
cooperative attitude among the distributors and point-
of-sale owners by providing various incentives like in-
stalling and replacing advertisement boards removed
during enforcement drives or compensating for losses in
case of seizers or challans.
“A point-of-sale owner told me that TI people came
to him to reimburse the challan (fine) and even re-
placed his advertisement boards that were removed
during the enforcement drives” (An academician and
researcher)
“TI instructs the sellers of cool lips (a flavored form
of smokeless tobacco) to distribute among the chil-
dren for which they paid incentives.” (A tobacco con-
trol enforcing official)
Most of the stakeholders opined that there is a shortage
of awareness at all levels, i.e. among the stakeholders,
the enforcers, the policymakers and the masses, which
hinders the proper implementation of the tobacco con-
trol laws.
“Lack of awareness and passion for tobacco control
is the root cause of the challenges that came up dur-
ing the implementation of tobacco control policies in
the state.” (A Deputy Director working in tobacco
control)
False propaganda and hiding of truth
Responses from the interviews provided an insight into
how the TI paints a bright picture in front of the public
and policymakers and hide their vested interests under
the garb of health promotion and social activities per-
formed by them.
Many responses from the interviewees highlighted the
fact that TI undertakes corporate social responsibility
(CSR) by which they depict their companies as ethically
correct and economically productive to society.
“TI offered to support our school intervention pro-
gram, and we denied it” (A tobacco control expert)
“Earlier, we (in NGO) used to carry out tobacco
control activities in collaboration with other
NGOs. But, when the tobacco companies started
CSR activities, they started funding many NGOs,
which resulted in rifts between NGOs to garner
funds from them (TI).” (A leading tobacco control
advocate)
By discrediting scientific evidence, TI misguides the
existing and future customers and discourages tobacco
users from quitting.
“They (TI) are advocating that the tobacco is not
harmful, tobacco is not causing cancer. They have
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many such studies (false evidence) to prove their
statements”. (An academician and researcher)
Some respondents reported misleading claims by TI rep-
resentatives of being a support for global tobacco regula-
tion that aligns with the FCTC
“A person who worked for tobacco control, later
joined as the head of ‘Foundation for Smoke Free
World’, an initiative by a leading multinational
tobacco company, wrote a mail to about 300
people all over the globe to join their organization
and the people who did not know much about TI
easily accepted his proposal.” (A Behavioral
Scientist)
Tobacco growing is the only means of earning for a sec-
tion of people. The TI doesn’t want the tobacco growers
to switch to other means of livelihood.
“Most of them, either tobacco growers, or tobacco
users are not aware of the big industry involved.
Only middlemen are aware of the industry nexus.”
(A leading health professional)
Manipulating front action groups
Most of the respondents stressed the manipulative pow-
ers of the TI. According to them, the main tactics used
by the TI were threats and manoeuvring acts.
Threats of legal action are the popular means used by
the TI to intimidate governments and activists who
introduce and support effective tobacco control policies.
Others provide physical threats to them. As per the re-
spondents, the mere threat of such litigation and phys-
ical threat discourages the whole implementation
process.
“Smokeless tobacco lobby always tries to threaten
our staff” (An Executive Director of an NGO)
“TI tries their best efforts to influence public health
policies by providing them with policy loopholes and
manipulating the facts. They are all directed to-
wards the single motive of increasing their business.”
(A Manager working with an NGO)
“When we asked them (tobacco sellers), why they
were again selling (tobacco), they said that it was be-
cause of physical threat (from tobacco dealers)” (A
tobacco cessation advocate)
With a vested interest, the tobacco company instigates
the front action groups to protest tobacco control laws
citing livelihood issue and harassment.
“I’m working closely with the government tobacco
control cell. Recently, they have instigated the re-
tailers to protest, over the livelihood issue.” (A lead-
ing health professional working for an NGO)
Rampant TAPS activities
As per the respondents, the TI uses tobacco advertising,
promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) to increase the con-
sumption of their products. The TI uses deceptive, mis-
leading, and predatory tactics to make tobacco use
appear glamorous and socially acceptable while minimiz-
ing perceptions of these products’ adverse health effects.
A respondent working in the implementation sector
said that the TI supports distributors and wholesalers by
performing various activities like paying daily wages to
petty sellers and providing signages and other posters
mandated under law to these retailer/vendors etc. Simi-
larly, by endorsing other brands and partnering with
other organization for sponsored events, they indirectly
advertise their company. This dissuades the existing cus-
tomers from quitting tobacco use.
“They do things indirectly, and it is like hide and
seek game with them (tobacco companies); because,
surrogate advertisements are still there, which we
(government) need to find or somebody has to inform
us.” (A public health professional)
“We have also taken efforts to stop various competi-
tions sponsored by tobacco industry like 'Sun-feast
competition', 'Spell bee', and 'Mangal deep' singing
competitions. These are against that order (Order
242).” (An advocate)
Besides, TI uses different tactics to create a new cus-
tomer base and maintain the existing one. Lowering of
price and selling components separately is another
tactic.
“We got to know that the TI came up with two
cigarette contained pack. So, that it is a pack (to-
bacco pack) and not a loose cigarette.” (An
academician)
“We convinced the new government to ban Gutkha.
But, since then, Gutkha is being marketed with to-
bacco and betel leaves separately in smaller packets
and in reduced rates.” (An academician).
Flavoured chewable tobacco products at point-of-sale at-
tract new customers, especially students and children.
“We had recently faced difficulty to seize a product
named ‘Cool lips’. This is a chewable form of tobacco
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sold like chocolates targeting the school children.
The pictures of the product are also available on the
internet.” (A tobacco control enforcing official).
TI provides financial support in reimbursement for the
penalty imposed by officials and bonuses for selling to-
bacco products. This encourages the tobacco sellers and
vendors to continue promoting tobacco products despite
legal actions.
“Cigarette companies and dealers used to promote
their products by giving some bonus or cash prizes to
the shopkeepers; they (shopkeepers) want that also.”
(A tobacco cessation advocate)
Others
Specific themes that were generated but couldn’t be cat-
egorized into any of the above-mentioned major do-
mains were compiled to constitute the sixth domain.
a. Government honoring TI officials (e.g., a leading
cigarette manufacturers CEO was awarded India’s
highest civilian award): Honoring TI officials acts as
a catalyst for TI to expand its business.
b. Poor awareness of harmful effects of tobacco among
ancillary stakeholders of TI (e.g., tobacco plant
growers, tobacco sellers): The TI takes advantage of
the lack of awareness of harmful effects of tobacco
among lower-level stakeholders.
c. Lack of common platform for tobacco control
discussion (reason for ineffective, uncoordinated
decision making and poor implementation of
tobacco control laws)
d. Lack of understanding of tobacco control and
limited support among government officials and
policymakers (especially elected politicians)
concerning tobacco control. Situational priority for
other communicable diseases, inadequate funding,
and lack of understanding of tobacco control
among government officials, poor coordination
between different government departments prompt
TI to flourish.
e. Situational priority (several immediate issues are
prioritized over tobacco control at the grassroots)
Challenges faced and the factors pertaining to the same
Many factors pose challenges at various level of tobacco
control. Our respondents enumerated a list of challenges
faced by them during the implementation of the
tobacco-control activities. The challenges are at different
levels and encroach the domain identified earlier in
Table 3. Various stakeholders attempt interference in
the different domains, as summarised in Table 4. The TI
deploys different strategies of interference to persuade
the public and decision-makers. The detailed taxonomy
for these strategies has been explicitly described in
Table 5 for the specific clause and recommendation of
article 5.3 that is either violated or in an apparent
contradiction to Article 5.3 specifically.
Tobacco control not given highest priority by government
officials
1. Tobacco control is not high on the Government’s
priority list, especially for departments other than
health. Revenue earned from TI is projected, and the
loss due to tobacco-related diseases is undermined.
Limited dedicated funds or workforce is allotted for
tobacco control. Trained officials are frequently
transferred, which leads to the intermittent imple-
mentation of tobacco control laws.
2. Inadequate political support against TI and limited
documented evidence
I. Lack of cohesion at institutional levels: There is
no common platform for discussion and adopting
strategies for tobacco control. Many departments are
not aware of their roles and responsibilities.
II. Lack of funding from international donors and
local corporates for tobacco control: There are
not many donors for tobacco control. The corporate
world seems to restrain itself from investment in
tobacco control.
Difficulty in implementation and enforcement
i. Lack of awareness: Second round of the Global
Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS)-India (2016–17) [31]
has depicted adequately high awareness regarding
the harmful impact of tobacco use. However, some of
the enforcing officials (police), politicians and
judiciary system are still unaware of the impact of
tobacco use and its consequences on society. TI
sponsored competitions, surrogate advertisements,
and partnerships are evidence of low awareness
among various stakeholders.
ii. Differential priority and lack of interest among
enforcement officials:
Most of the enforcing officials are multitasked. For in-
stance, they are delegated responsibly to mitigate sea-
sonal communicable diseases (like Dengue), which poses
an immediate threat. Many senior officials are not con-
vinced enough to attend all the tobacco-related meetings.
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Mode of approach by the tobacco industry
TI contacts different tobacco control activists and officials
for preventing tampering with their business. Half of the
participants reported being approached by TI in various
ways. Two of the participants were approached directly,
whereas three of them indirectly. One participant reported
being approached by both means. Multiple reasons cited
were 1) not to create awareness on harmful effects of to-
bacco 2) not to harass shopkeepers in the name of
COTPA violations 3) enquire about tobacco cessation ac-
tivities implemented by the Government. Two participants
reported being threatened directly by TI for interfering
with their business. A participant was offered undue fa-
vours to maintain a distance from TI’s business. Three
participants reported being aware of tobacco control ad-
vocates threatened by TI.
Discussion
The failure of the Government to adopt measures that
are proven to reduce tobacco consumption is mainly
due to interference in the Government’s policy-making
process by the TI. This has been documented for many
HICs and LMICs [32, 33] but has not yet been
attempted from India, one of the major business hubs
for TI. This is the first of its kind study from India to
document TII and its prevalent types. The findings can
be used to construct a model applicable on a larger scale
for governments of various countries to recognize and
prevent TII in policy-making decisions. Constructivist
grounded theory was used to identify techniques and ar-
guments, which were later categorized into general strat-
egies’ and finally, a taxonomy and TII activity model was
created. We were able to identify six major domains
Table 5 Tobacco industry interference and actors which challenge tobacco control efforts, based on responses of tobacco control
experts who participated in the study
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under which TII activities can be classified through our
qualitative analysis.
Most of the respondents agreed that TI is constantly
influencing policy and administrative decisions. WHO
FCTC’s Article 5.3 and guidelines took cognizance of
this conflict and advocated steps to check the influence
of TI on public health policy-making [9, 34]. However,
the findings of a contemporary report by FCTC signals
the requirement of further advancement to address this
issue [35].. Like our study, a report from three South-
East Asian countries has demonstrated that the TI in
Thailand tries to undermine the progress made in to-
bacco control. By contrast, in Indonesia, it has a free
hand to influence the Government. Myanmar is encour-
aging foreign investments, including the TI; hence, it is
open to the TI despite the tobacco-control endeavor
taken by the Ministry of Health and Sport [3]. Tobacco
and tobacco products generate large volumes of the In-
dian Government’s tax revenue, which can be as high as
Rs. 43,000 crores annually [36]. Even though tobacco
taxation is the most economical way to control tobacco
use, it is the least utilized policy measure [37]. Such a
large chunk of revenue puts them in a better position to
be listened to and participate in decision-making pro-
cesses. TI portrays themselves as playing a major role in
the economic overhauling of their region from which
they are operating through revenue generation and live-
lihood creation, thus diverting attention from other per-
tinent issues [11]. Another study from the United States
has also stated that the economy of the six south-eastern
states- also known as the “tobacco bloc” of the south-
eastern United States- is extremely dependent on the
growing and manufacturing of tobacco. However, the
jobs related to the main tobacco sector in these states is
merely 1.6% [38]. Similarly, corporates sponsoring the
events and organizations is a well-known tool for mar-
keting, which corroborates the findings from the present
study [35]. As per marketing literature, funding boosts
the image of a corporation, connects the funding com-
pany’s name with interests significant to a specific target
group, provide fruitful exposure to the product, target
particular populations comprising groups that are hard
to reach by conventional advertising modes and bestows
fame to the company with the help of highly visible ac-
tivities [39].
The results of the study show that the TI takes benefit
of the policy loopholes and tries to evade the obligations.
Previous literature has also highlighted that whenever a
new law is made, or the previous one is amended, there
are always certain weak points left that are mostly due
to professional lobbying by the TI, who then use those
loopholes for their profit [21, 40, 41]. Previous literature
has already documented that TI gives undue favors to
political parties in power or even in opposition to delay
implementation of the legislative procedures [42, 43].
This can be better explained by a case study from
Malaysia, where the Government, along with the en-
actment of Control of Tobacco Product (Amendment)
Regulations (CTPR) 2008, initiated pictorial health
warnings (PHWs). Lack of a specification for mini-
mum permitted pack size for PHWs was a major
weakness in it, which resulted in the import of
cigarette packs named ‘Sampoerna Avolution’ in the
shape of small ‘lipstick’ boxes from Indonesia. There
was serious manipulation in PHW on the package
and it was nearly unidentifiable [44].
On the same lines, most of the stakeholders observed
interference with implementing tobacco control laws
and activities; which is regarded as another common
form of TII tactics. One of the vital tools for improving
tobacco control is litigation and judicial interpretations,
which have played a beneficial role by institutionalizing
laws for tobacco control in many jurisdictions across the
globe [45]. However, it also remains one of the most sig-
nificant challenges for the governments to protect to-
bacco control efforts from litigation by the TI [46]. The
TI interferes with the judiciary system and tobacco con-
trol activists to delay decision-making and implementa-
tion of the rules [47]. Previous case reports have
demonstrated how the threat of a potential international
lawsuit can create a chilling effect by helping delay the
implementation of public health policies [48]. Our re-
spondent agreed that the lack of sustained funding to
drive the tobacco control efforts had been a constant
bottleneck. TI mediates this shortage by lobbying against
the tobacco cessation programs, similar to observations
made in other countries [49]. Tobacco control activity
and effectiveness are left vulnerable if its funding is
dependent on short-term funding pledges. All countries,
even the poorest, have the means to reduce tobacco use
if tobacco taxes are increased and funds are applied to
fund comprehensive tobacco control programmes [50].
Governments in various countries have been sued by
the TI to check the laws thoroughly or hamper their im-
plementation [51–54]. In Brazil, TI brought a judicial
claim arguing that the National Health Surveillance
Agency (ANVISA) didn’t have legal authority for regula-
tion of tobacco products, which resulted in a delay of six
years in implementing the ban on flavours and additives
in tobacco products. Similarly, in Bangladesh, due to the
Bangladesh Cigarette Manufacturers’ Association’s
(BMCA) interference, temporary permission to print pic-
torial health warnings (PHWs) on the lower parts of the
pack was granted to TI by the law ministry on March
16, 2016 [55]. In Nepal, the tobacco control advocates
effectively utilized domestic litigations, advocacy with
politicians, legislators and other stakeholders for thwart-
ing the TII in the enactment of comprehensive tobacco
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control policy in the country [56, 57]. Case reports from
other LMIC suggest that constant engagement by the to-
bacco control advocates with the support of inter-
national tobacco control agencies and local health
groups is required to counter the TII during the imple-
mentation phases of tobacco control policies national/
sub-national level [53, 58–61].
As the evidence for the lethal impact of tobacco prod-
ucts started mounting, the companies created uncer-
tainty and dispute regarding health risks while putting
filters on cigarettes and promised research into the
health effects of smoking to address growing public con-
cern. Further, there is strong evidence from the Master
Settlement Agreement in 1998, which shows that the
radioactivity of tobacco smoke and its potential to cause
cancer were known to TI, but they purposefully con-
cealed this information [62]. In another instance in the
USA, a network of consultants was developed by TI to
advocate ventilation as a “remedy” to second-hand
smoke (SHS) [63]. The sheer bulk of tobacco advertise-
ment contributes to the erroneous notion of normalizing
smoking in various contexts [64–67]. Under so-called
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, millions
of dollars are spent by TI each year, by giving scholar-
ships to economically weaker students, funding projects
for poverty alleviation, providing assistance during nat-
ural calamities; just to divert users’ concerns and main-
tain a good image before them [68, 69].
The industry has also constantly manipulated the
front action groups [70–72]. TI coherently works with
several business allies and third parties to impede ef-
fective tobacco control legislation and programmes.
For instance, the International Tobacco Growers’ As-
sociation - a TI funded tobacco farmer’s lobby group
- worked as a front-group in developing countries.
Tobacco manufacturers have repeatedly instigated the
farmers to represent their views, however, but always
had a blind eye towards the long-pending concerns of
the farmers, who were not being benefitted from the
profit that was being generated [33]. In another in-
stance, the TI documents state that a multinational
tobacco company contributed financially to existing
hospitality associations. It made its own “association”
to halt the accretions in developing smoke-free envi-
ronments [56, 73].
TI circumvents laws to promote their products by
using innovative and sometimes covert marketing strat-
egies despite TAPS prohibition laws [74–76]. When
pressure on TI increased, indirect or proxy tobacco ad-
vertising such as dark advertising, brand stretching, cor-
porate social responsibility (CSR) activities, promotion
through films and new media such as the internet, dis-
counts or free-gift offers, distribution of free samples,
sale of tobacco products in the form of children’s
sweets/toys, etc. gained impetus. Guidelines for imple-
menting Article 13 of FCTC describe comprehensive
TAPS ban to apply to all forms of commercial commu-
nication, recommendation or action and all forms of
contribution to any event, activity or individual with the
aim, effect or likely effect of promoting a tobacco prod-
uct or tobacco use either directly or indirectly. A litera-
ture review has depicted that TI and their allies in
Government were also able to use trade concerns over
tobacco to successfully help prevent the implementation
of TAPS for a significant durations of time [61].
This study has specific strengths. First, it is the first
study from India that attempts to document and
categorize the TII in preventing the implementation of
effective anti-tobacco laws in the country. Second, it re-
ports interviews from a wide range of players working in
and around the TI in every sector and each part of the
country for a comprehensive picture of TI. However,
there are certain limitations. Even though a variety of
stakeholders was interviewed, the sample size was small.
Also, they were purposively selected from the existing
knowledge of the investigation team. It is worth docu-
menting here that the group of investigators were ex-
perts working at the country and state level in tobacco
control who are pretty knowledgeable about the sample
panel for the study. Further, there were considerable
similarities and compatibility in the views of the stake-
holders from varied branches and different parts within
the country, indicating that they are indeed representa-
tive of the stakeholders.
There are several policy implications of this study.
One, this work has highlighted various strategies trad-
itionally used by the TI for diluting and deterring
specific policies, that can further provide insights to
policymakers about their nefarious tactics. Two, the
listed strategies will enable stakeholders to foresee
and prevent the types of alliances the TI may attempt
to build. Three, this study will stimulate academicians
and researchers to go in-depth into various strategies
highlighted in the paper for getting more evidence on
this important subject. They can also use the study to
produce and communicate information to the policy-
makers, paying attention to the audience and lan-
guage. Four, the work underscores the need for
ensuring clarity in official interaction with the TI and
lobbyists. Ultimately, the strategies can provide public
health advocates and policymakers with a dominating
position from which they can plan narratives and
strategies proactively and not merely react to those of
the TI. Further empirical work is required to docu-
ment the country-based examples of TII and
categorize them under each strategy domain pre-
sented in this study to further advance the Indian
stance in countering TII.
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Conclusions
The present qualitative analysis documents the signifi-
cant interference of TI in different domains with stake-
holders acting at various hierarchical levels. This study
can be beneficial for the public health community and
policymakers at the national, regional and international
levels to provide insight into the nefarious tactics of TI,
enable stakeholders to anticipate and pre-empt the kinds
of alliances the TI may attempt to build and stimulate
academicians and researchers to undertake in-depth
analysis into various strategies highlighted in the paper.
The research also underscores the need for ensuring
thorough transparency in official interaction with the TI
and lobbyists. Future studies should generate more evi-
dence of TII in different domains that emerged from the
current paper-like tobacco pack health warnings, TAPS,
Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (ENDS) (e-ciga-
rettes, and so on. Suppose the public health experts or
policymakers intend to face the TI for legislative en-
forcement. In that case, they need to choose a scientific
approach by generating enough evidence against TI that
exposes its true face on both the global and local front.
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